The Rise And Fall of *Chevron* in tax: From the Early Days to *King* and Beyond

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INTRODUCTION

In the third of a century since it was handed down, *Chevron*¹ has become by far the most widely cited case in U.S. legal history.² This fact may cause one to view *Chevron* as an independent phenomenon. Yet deference doctrine generally and *Chevron* in particular are better understood as part of the ocean of administrative law. They are moved by the same gales as roil that ocean.

*Chevron* rose in tax over several decades. It is now receding in tax. *King v. Burwell*³ is part of that recession and may well contribute to its acceleration.

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² See, e.g., *STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY* 247 (6th ed. 2006). The gap has widened in the years since.
These phenomena are not random. Both the flood tide and the neap tide resulted from the pull of broader administrative law currents. *Chevron’s* level rose in tax because of the bankruptcy of tax parochialism, the view that tax is unique and so should fall largely outside of administrative law rules.

*Chevron’s* level is falling in tax for the same reason it is falling generally. Administrative law is an ever-shifting balance of practical expediency and constitutional legitimacy. This leaves many administrative law doctrines with roots too shallow to thrive.

So it is with *Chevron*. Internal inconsistencies in *Chevron* have become more, not less, glaring over time. *Chevron* was murky from the start and has become murkier with passing years. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a rising chorus has elaborated *Chevron’s* inadequacies, called for its abrogation, and charted its decline.

I added my voice to that chorus in a 2012 article. That article noted that “there appears to be a move afoot to downplay *Chevron*, not in name but in fact,” and it predicted that, rather than *Chevron* being expressly overturned, the likeliest outcome would be that the courts would “continue to honor *Chevron* in name but apply it so that, in substance, it is no longer an independently operative principle of law.” Those drawn to honest labeling might prefer that the Court formally overturn *Chevron*. But, although the Court sometimes does overrule its precedents, its preference is to keep things fluid, in order to facilitate coalition building and preserve room for

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4. E.g., Ann Woolhandler, *Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History*, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 245 (1991) (“[O]ne cannot conclude that there is one ideal and elegant allocation of power between court and agency where administrative law will necessarily have to rest.”).

5. An excellent report noted: “[T]he degree of deference that federal courts owe to administrative pronouncements is a vexing issue, one frequently scrutinized by the Supreme Court. Regular attention from the Supreme Court, however, has failed to produce clarity for administrative law, in general, or for tax law, in particular.” ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 719–20 (2004).


10. Id. at 280–81.

11. Id. at 283.

maneuver in future cases.\textsuperscript{13} Given this preference, keeping \textit{Chevron} alive in name only may be the best reasonably attainable outcome.

Part I of this article sketches the rise of \textit{Chevron} in tax, culminating in the Supreme Court’s \textit{Mayo} decision in 2011,\textsuperscript{14} rejecting tax exceptionalism. A recurring note is ambiguity—uncertainty as to the reach and meaning of \textit{Chevron}.

Part II explores the fall of \textit{Chevron} in tax. \textit{Chevron} has receded in tax because it, at least in its original form, is receding everywhere. Realization of \textit{Chevron}’s inadequacies is causing the courts to multiply exceptions to \textit{Chevron} and to apply it in ways that rob \textit{Chevron} of its original deferential nature.

Part III concludes. It opines that the rise and fall of \textit{Chevron} in tax do not represent wasted motion leaving us in the same place as where we started. Instead, by opening to a wider world of administrative law, tax practice has the potential to improve.\textsuperscript{15}

I. \textit{Chevron}’s Rise in Tax

A. Before \textit{Chevron}

Deference issues did not begin with \textit{Chevron}. In tax and other areas, the courts have wrestled for centuries with the weight to accord to agency rules and interpretations.\textsuperscript{16}

These cases instructed that tax regulations should be upheld “unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.”\textsuperscript{17} Thus, in their verbal formulation at least, the pre-\textit{Chevron} tax cases remind one of the deferential part of \textit{Chevron}: its step two.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, \textit{Ways of Criticizing the Court}, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 817–30 (1982).
\item \textsuperscript{15} For a discussion of the opportunities created for taxpayers by the entry of administrative law into tax, see Johnson, \textit{supra} note 9, at 300–25.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Comm’r v. S. Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); see also Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (to be valid, a regulation must “be consistent with the statute, [and] it must be reasonable”). For discussion of prominent pre-\textit{Chevron} tax cases, see Steve R. Johnson, \textit{Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion of National Muffler}, 112 Tax Notes 351, 362–65 (July 24, 2006).
\end{itemize}
The most frequently cited case of the line, *National Muffler*, used the same general reasonableness formulation.\(^1^8\) It also distilled prior cases to identify six considerations potentially relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.\(^1^9\)

**B. Chevron and Its Immediate Aftermath**

In 1984 in *Chevron*, the Court unanimously upheld an EPA regulation.\(^2^0\) Based on notions of expertise, political responsiveness, and delegation, the Court concluded that Congress usually wants agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps.\(^2^1\) It announced the famous “two step” under which a court asks first whether the statute is ambiguous.\(^2^2\) If it is, the court asks second whether the agency’s position is at least reasonable.\(^2^3\)

It was initially unclear whether *Chevron* applied to all agency actions. Subsequent cases, most prominently *Mead*,\(^2^4\) answered the question in the negative. *Mead* held that an agency’s interpretation “qualifies for *Chevron* deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation . . . was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”\(^2^5\) *Mead* converted the *Chevron* two step into a three step, the new step (step zero because it necessarily precedes step one) being determining whether *Chevron* applies at all to the case at hand.\(^2^6\)

Agency interpretations not satisfying *Mead* are evaluated under the *Skidmore* “standard,”\(^2^7\) which is neither a standard nor deferential.\(^2^8\) Unsurprisingly, therefore, *Skidmore* “has produced a spectrum of judicial

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\(^1^9\) Id. at 477 (rehearsig contemporaneity of the regulation and the statute, the manner of evolution of non-contemporaneous regulations, the tenure of the regulation, the reliance placed upon it, the consistency of interpretation, and the degree of congressional scrutiny during reenactments).


\(^2^1\) Id. at 843–45, 865–66.

\(^2^2\) Id. at 842–43, 865.

\(^2^3\) Id.


\(^2^5\) Id. at 226–27.


\(^2^8\) According to *Skidmore*, “[t]he weight [accorded to the agency’s position] will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id.

Ultimately, an undifferentiated “all factors” test is not a test at all. *E.g.*, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 n.5 (1982). And, upholding the agency only if the court agrees with “the validity of [the agency’s] reasoning” can hardly be described as deference. *Skidmore*, 323 U.S. at 140.
responses, from great respect at one end . . . to near indifference at the other.”

Chevron’s domain seemed to expand in 2005 in Brand X, which held that agencies can often, in effect, overrule judicial decisions. “A court’s prior construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”

C. Mayo

Views differed as to whether Chevron did and should apply to tax. Some took an understandable but regrettable view that “tax is special; the normal administrative law rules don’t apply to us.”

The Supreme Court had frequent opportunities to settle this question in the 1980s through early 2000s. Unfortunately, the Court at first compounded the confusion rather than dispelling it. In the 1985 Boyle case, the Court cited Chevron but not National Muffler. In 1991 Cottage Savings case, the Court cited National Muffler’s general language but not its six particular considerations and not Chevron. In 1998 in Atlantic Mutual, the Court cited both Chevron and Cottage Savings but not National Muffler. In 2001 in Cleveland Indians, the Court cited National Muffler but not Chevron. In 2003 in Boeing, the Court cited Cottage Savings but neither Chevron nor National Muffler. In none of these cases did the Court explain why it applied or eschewed the various precedents.

Nonetheless, it was widely accepted that Chevron did supply the governing standard when specific authority tax regulations are challenged.

29. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
The majority view was that *Chevron* also controlled challenges to general authority tax regulations.\(^39\)

Any lingering doubt was—or should have been—dispelled by the Court’s 2011 *Mayo* decision.\(^40\) *Mayo* is significant for three reasons. First, dealing a mortal blow to tax exceptionalism, the Court stressed “the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.”\(^41\) The Court did preface this statement with the observation that the taxpayer had failed to offer a justification for departing from the administrative law norm. “In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”\(^42\) Taken literally, this might leave an opening for taxpayers to develop justifications in future cases challenging tax regulations. However, it is likely that this ship has already sailed.

Second, the *Mayo* Court made clear that “[t]he principles underlying our decision in *Chevron* apply with full force in the tax context. . . . We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to *Chevron* to the same extent as our review of other regulations.”\(^43\) Thus, the Court held—and *Mayo* was decided unanimously—that *Chevron*, rather than *National Muffler*, “provide[s] the appropriate framework.”\(^44\)

Some commentators still urge that *National Muffler* be resurrected in whole or in part.\(^45\) Life is endlessly surprising. Nonetheless, I expect that *National Muffler* will be revived around the time the Romanovs regain the throne of Russia. Not only was *Mayo* a unanimous decision, it also—far from being a radical doctrinal revision—is consistent with ample post-*National Muffler* precedents. *Mayo* specifically rejected several *National Muffler* factors, such as consistency, antiquity, and contemporaneity.\(^46\) Previous cases had done so as well.\(^47\)


\(^41\) Id. at 55 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).

\(^42\) Id.

\(^43\) Id. at 55–56.

\(^44\) Id. at 57.


\(^46\) Mayo, 562 U.S. at 54–55.

Third, the Court made clear that the same standard applies to general authority regulations as applies to specific authority regulations. The regulation at issue in Mayo had been promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a), not under a delegation within a specific section. The Court noted both pre-Chevron cases stating that specific authority tax regulations receive greater deference than general authority tax regulations and post-Chevron cases according deference to general authority regulations. The Court stated that “the administrative landscape has changed significantly” since the pre-Chevron tax cases and that, especially when the regulation has gone through notice-and-comment procedures, the policies behind Chevron are engaged no less by general authority delegations than by specific authority delegations.

However, Chevron does not control when the IRS’s position is embodied in a pronouncement of less stature than regulations. Revenue rulings, notices, and the like typically are not submitted for notice and comment and do not have the force of law. It is now essentially settled that the validity of such positions is measured under Skidmore, not Chevron.
II. THE FALL OF CHEVRON IN TAX (AND ELSEWHERE)

The Supreme Court considered Chevron in two tax cases after Mayo: Home Concrete \(^{55}\) and King \(^{56}\). As discussed below, Chevron was of no help to the IRS either time. Chevron still occasionally supports pro-agency outcomes at the Supreme Court \(^{57}\) and lower court levels. \(^{58}\) On the whole, however, the Court has shown itself adept at finding ways to undercut Chevron.

Below, we first note the “why” of limiting Chevron, that is, the deficiencies of Chevron that inspire caution about applying the case robustly. Given space constraints, this endeavor will involve enumeration, not detailed exploration. Thereafter, we will address the “how” of limitation, that is, the variety of doctrinal devices courts have used since Mayo to avoid Chevron or to limit its effect.

A. The Why of Limitation

The complaint most frequently lodged against Chevron involves its unpredictability, both as to when it will be applied and what results it will produce when applied. \(^{59}\) Part of the confusion is the persistent use of “deference” to refer to both force-of-law regulations and mere non-binding guidance documents, two different kinds of agency positions. \(^{60}\)

But there are deeper problems. Chevron lacks an adequate theoretical foundation. \(^{61}\) One problem is that the notion of delegation—which, as we have seen, is a major prop of Chevron—is an unhelpful fiction. \(^{62}\)

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Another fundamental problem is the failure of Chevron to deal convincingly with an old problem. The Vesting Clause of Article I of the Constitution\textsuperscript{63} confers the lawmaking power upon Congress. Congress cannot delegate that power.\textsuperscript{64} The Vesting Clause of Article III\textsuperscript{65} confers upon the courts the power to “say what the law is.”\textsuperscript{66} This power too may not be delegated.\textsuperscript{67} Why then can agencies create binding law to fill in statutory gaps, and why will courts defer to agency interpretations that the courts believe are wrong though not so obviously wrong as to be unreasonable?\textsuperscript{68}

Various attempts have been made to square the power Chevron seemingly gives to agencies with these constitutional provisions,\textsuperscript{69} but no durable consensus has yet emerged. Doubts on this score are never far beneath the surface and have been powerfully voiced by some justices in recent cases.\textsuperscript{70}

Such concerns are compounded by the fact that Chevron created a judicial rule to allocate power when a statutory rule doing just that already existed. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) includes provisions governing judicial review of agency actions. It empowers federal courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, [or] in excess of statutory . . . authority.”\textsuperscript{71} Yet, in the view of some, “[h]eelpless of the original design of the APA, [the Supreme Court has] developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies’ interpretations,” expanding the power of agencies beyond the balance

\textsuperscript{63} U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
\textsuperscript{64} E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1825).
\textsuperscript{65} U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
\textsuperscript{66} Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
\textsuperscript{68} E.g., Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 826 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., writing for the Court) (“A court must uphold the [agency’s] judgment as long as it is a permissible construction of the statute, even if it differs from how the court would have interpreted the statute in the absence of an agency regulation.”).
\textsuperscript{69} As to the Article I problem, see J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1928) (noting that the three branches share the various powers, and stating that, when Congress lays down an intelligible principle to guide the agency, the agency does not make law but is merely the agent of Congress).
\textsuperscript{70} E.g., DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1240–52 (Thomas, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{71} 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2012).
Congress struck in the APA. Underlying these objections is concern that deference doctrine has abetted fundamental transformation of the American constitutional structure. “The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s vast and varied federal bureaucracy and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social, and political activities.”

Deference doctrine, some justices believe, has been one of the culprits.

Perhaps there is some unique historical justification for deferring to federal agencies, but [the] cases reveal how paltry an effort we have made to understand it or to confine ourselves to its boundaries... [W]e seem to be straying further and further from the Constitution without so much as pausing to ask why. We should stop to consider that document before blithely giving the force of law to any other agency “interpretations” of federal statutes.

B. The How of Limitation

All of the justices of the Supreme Court have written or joined opinions expressing the above or other concerns about Chevron. Yet the justices diverge as to which concerns are substantial and the weight to be accorded each. As a result, recent cases drain Chevron of vitality through an accumulation of exceptions rather than eviscerating Chevron with a single blow. Consider the following four avenues of erosion of Chevron on display in tax and non-tax cases decided since Mayo.

1. Ignoring Chevron

We have seen that, before Mayo, the Supreme Court sometimes applied Chevron or other deference doctrines in tax cases and sometimes did not, without explaining its choices. Something similar happened in 2015 in Inclusive Communities, a non-tax case. A community group sued a state

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72. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers’ Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1212 (remarking that this problem is “perhaps insoluble if Chevron is not to be uprooted”); see also William R. Andersen, Against Chevron—A Modest Proposal, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 957, 972 (2004).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 33 to 37.
housing agency, challenging the agency’s allocation of low income housing tax credits. As the case was wending its way through litigation, the federal Department of Housing and Urban Affairs (“HUD”) promulgated a regulation supporting the community group’s interpretation of the key statute, the Fair Housing Act.\(^77\) By five to four, the Supreme Court held for the community group.\(^78\) 

Chevron had no impact on the resolution of the case. The four dissenters thought the HUD regulation was invalid because it was contrary to the statute and did not represent HUD’s considered view of the matter.\(^79\) The majority was even less interested in Chevron. It resolved the case on the basis of statutory interpretation, without invoking Chevron.\(^80\)

2. Fashioning Exceptions

In 2001, the Supreme Court in Mead carved a major exception out of Chevron,\(^81\) and other exceptions also exist. Two of them were rehearsed in 2015 in the high profile King case, which considered the availability of tax credits for insurance purchased on federally created insurance exchanges.\(^82\) The Court refused to defer to a Treasury regulation because of two recognized exceptions to Chevron: (1) the agency lacked expertise in the particular area\(^83\) and (2) absent clear indication in the statute, courts presume that Congress did not intend to delegate to agencies matters of deep economic or social significance fundamental to the statutory regime.\(^84\) Depending on how their contours are defined in future cases, both exceptions have the potential to significantly limit the ambit of Chevron.

And the common law task of forging new exceptions to deference doctrine continues. For example, one recent circuit court case questioned whether Chevron could apply to an excise tax regulation absence evidence

\(^78\) Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2525–26.
\(^79\) Id. at 2542–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
\(^80\) Id. at 2525 (“The Court holds that [the requirements of the HUD regulation] are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language, the Court’s interpretation of similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’ ratification . . . , and the statutory purpose.”).
\(^81\) See supra text accompanying notes 24 to 29.
\(^83\) Id. at 2489 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006)).
that Treasury had taken into consideration the interpretational principle against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.\(^85\) Given the plethora of canons of construction littering the landscape, this sort of approach could have major implications if it becomes popular.

Similarly, another post-*Mayo* tax case limited *Brand X* deference. In the *Home Concrete* case in 2012, the Supreme Court invalidated a Treasury regulation involving the extended statute of limitations on assessment provided by I.R.C. § 6501(e).\(^86\) Although *Brand X* had held that *Chevron*-qualified regulations can trump judicial precedents, the plurality in *Home Concrete* held that a decision preceding the regulation had so narrowed the interpretational space that there was no statutory gap for Treasury to fill via regulation.\(^87\)

3. **Conflating *Chevron* and Other Standards**

*Chevron* can continue to be cited but be deprived of generative power if it is collapsed into or merged with other doctrines. This appears to be occurring. First, I and others have argued that step one logically is subsumed in step two, reducing *Chevron* to a simple reasonableness test.\(^88\) Some case law support for this approach is emerging.\(^89\) Similarly, an increasing number of cases are conflating *Chevron*’s step two with arbitrary-and-capricious analysis under the APA.\(^90\)

4. **Applying the Standard Non-Deferentially**

Doctrines of law always have two aspects: their verbal formulation and the spirit in which they are applied. Of the two, the latter is far more important to the outcomes of controversies. The spirit in which *Chevron* is applied has changed. *Chevron* originally was indulgent and friendly towards

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\(^85\) Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dictum).


\(^88\) *E.g.*, Johnson, *supra* note 9, at 284–85; Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, *Chevron Has Only One Step*, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).

\(^89\) *E.g.*, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–11 (2015) (invalidating a regulation as being an unreasonable interpretation of the statute without locating its analysis under either step one or step two); *Utility Air*, 134 S. Ct. at 2442–49 (ruling similar to *Michigan*); *Home Concrete*, 132 S. Ct. at 1846 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“‘Step 1’ has never been an essential part of *Chevron* analysis.”).

agency action, and it is still spoken of that way by some.\textsuperscript{91} But that characterization often is no longer accurate. Now, many cases are applying \textit{Chevron} in a searching, rigorous fashion, converting it from a shield to protect agency actions into a sword with which to assail them.\textsuperscript{92}

This is evident in \textit{City of Arlington}, a 2013 \textit{Chevron} case in which the Court instructed: “No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, \textit{whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.”}\textsuperscript{93} The Court urged judges to “tak[e] seriously, and apply[] rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.”\textsuperscript{94}

This rigor was in display in the 2014 \textit{Utility Air} case in which the Court, citing \textit{City of Arlington}, invalidated a non-tax regulation.\textsuperscript{95} In tax, it also was evident in the widely discussed \textit{Loving}\textsuperscript{96} and \textit{Ridgely}\textsuperscript{97} cases invalidating Treasury regulations governing practice before the IRS,\textsuperscript{98} and in the Supreme Court’s 2015 state tax \textit{Brohl} case.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

We have seen the rise of \textit{Chevron} in tax, culminating in \textit{Mayo} in 2011, and its fall in tax and elsewhere; a fall in substantive significance, although perhaps not frequency of citation. We have located the causes of the fall in \textit{Chevron}’s own inconsistencies and inadequate conceptualization. And, we have sketched the forms the downgrading of \textit{Chevron}’s significance have taken in recent cases.\textsuperscript{100}

Has this all been wasted judicial effort going around in a doctrinal circle? Does it leave us in the same place we were before \textit{Chevron} was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} E.g., \textit{Michigan}, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
\item \textsuperscript{92} See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, \textit{Loving and Legitimacy: IRS Regulation of Tax Return Preparation}, 59 \textit{Vill. L. Rev.}, 515, 528–29 (2014); \textit{Executive Board}, supra note 59, at 239 (“Many modern scholars conclude that contrary to the view that \textit{Chevron} mandated deference . . . , it has in fact given the judiciary additional power to determine the legitimacy of agency rulemaking.”).
\item \textsuperscript{93} \textit{City of Arlington} v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.} at 1874.
\item \textsuperscript{95} \textit{Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA}, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442–49 (2014).
\item \textsuperscript{96} \textit{Loving v. IRS}, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ridgely v. Lew}, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{98} For discussion of these cases, see Steve R. Johnson, \textit{How Far Does Circular 230 Exceed Treasury’s Statutory Authority?}, 146 \textit{TAX NOTES} 221 (Jan. 12, 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{100} Not all agree with my description of the trajectory. Some maintain that \textit{Chevron} is merely evolving, not diminishing. E.g., \textit{Executive Board}, supra note 59, at 240. This is hardly surprising. The history of \textit{Chevron} has been marked by disagreement and “consistent shifts in . . . scholarship.” \textit{Id.} at 235.
\end{itemize}
handed down, with no recompense for the journey? No. We are better off in two ways. First, despite a few whose conversion remains in the future, the center of gravity of the tax community now understands that returning to the cloister of tax parochialism is not an option.

Second, both in tax and other areas, jurists and commentators find it increasingly difficult to ignore or paper over the serious flaws of *Chevron*. Adopting a wider angle of vision, we see that the flaws are not those of *Chevron* alone. They infect deference doctrine generally and are the rot at the core of the separation of powers doctrine on which general administrative law is based. Seeing that more clearly, ours will be the opportunity and the obligation to mend these rents in the fabric of American law.

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